Research

Working Papers

Decentralized Coordination Under Imperfect Monitoring: Toward a Theory of Non-Market Allocation (In Progress)

Working Abstract: How can autonomous production units coordinate resource allocation without market prices and under imperfect monitoring? This paper develops a mechanism design framework for non-market coordination in environments characterized by imperfect information, changing economic conditions, and agents with heterogeneous objectives. Drawing on the literature on repeated games with imperfect monitoring, I model decentralized units that observe noisy signals of others' actions and must coordinate without converging to a stationary equilibrium. The framework addresses three requirements that any viable non-market allocation mechanism must satisfy: functioning during transitions rather than only in steady state, operating under imperfect and costly information flows, and accommodating a plurality of evaluative criteria across units. I seek to characterize conditions under which stable coordination is achievable as a function of signal precision, discount factors, and the number of coordinating units. The paper contributes to the mechanism design literature on resource allocation without prices and connects to longstanding debates in political economy over the feasibility of rational allocation without prices.

The Leviathan and the Earth’s Crust: Mapping the Rare Earths Metal Supply Chain (In Progress)

Abstract: Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical inputs in the production of electric vehicles, wind turbines, defense systems, and other advanced technologies, yet the propagation of REE price shocks through downstream industries remains poorly understood. This paper uses the Leontief price model combined with commodity price data to trace how volatility in REE prices transmits through the supply chain to producer and consumer goods in a multi-country setting. I decompose the REE supply chain into mining, processing, and end-use stages, and examine the forward linkages from raw material prices to downstream cost structures using international input-output tables. The analysis highlights the distinction between REE price formation in commodity markets, which is characterized by opacity and thin trading, and the underlying cost-price structure implied by the production network. The paper contributes to the empirical literature on price propagation in production networks and to ongoing policy debates over critical mineral supply chain resilience.

Pandemic, Inflation, and Automotive Theft, 2020-2023

Abstract: Motor vehicle theft rose 42 percent in the United States from 2019 to 2023, even as overall property crime declined. Did rising used vehicle prices contribute to this surge? I exploit variation in vehicle ownership across cities, interacting predetermined shares with national price changes for each vehicle type. Cities more exposed to vehicles that appreciated strongly saw larger theft increases. Two cities differing by one standard deviation in SUV ownership showed 24 percent differential theft growth. Effects concentrate in Western states and near major ports, consistent with theft-for-export networks documented in federal prosecutions. In interior cities, price exposure does not predict theft. Pre-trends tests support the parallel trends assumption. The geographic concentration suggests that price incentives generate large theft responses only where stolen vehicles can be converted to cash through export channels.

(Email for draft)